1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 2:17-CV-07316-ES-MAH		
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	DR. NING XI, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
4	Plaintiff,		
5	MOTION HEARING FOR TRO		
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7	INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, INC.,		
8	Defendant. Pages 1 - 74		
9	<del></del>		
10	U.S. District Court of New Jersey 50 Walnut Street, Newark, New Jersey 07101		
	Tuesday, September 26, 2017		
11			
12	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE ESTHER SALAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
13			
14	<u>APPEARANCES</u> :		
15	BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC		
16	BY: DAVID A. SCHUMACHER, ESQUIRE AND: JOSEPH VERNON, ESQUIRE		
17	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
18	DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP BY: MICHAEL A. LINDSAY, ESQUIRE		
	AND: BRUCE R. EWING, ESQUIRE		
19	Attorneys for Defendant		
20	ALSO PRESENT: JONATHAN WIGGINS		
21	Pursuant to Section 753 Title 28 United States Code, the		
22	following transcript is certified to be an accurate record as		
23	taken stenographically in the above-entitled proceedings. /S/ Mary-Jo Monteleone		
24	MARY-JO MONTELEONE, CCR, CRCR		
25	Official Court Reporter (973) 645-3833		
	maryjo_monteleone@dnj.uscourts.gov		

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1 THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. We're on the 2 record in the matter of Dr. Ning Xi v. The Institute of 3 Electrical & Electronics Engineers, et al., selection number 4 17-7316. Let me have appearances by counsel. 5 MR. VERNON: Good afternoon, your Honor. Joel Vernon 6 7 for Dr. Ning Xi. 8 MR. SCHUMACHER: David Schumacher for the plaintiffs 9 as well, your Honor. 10 MR. LINDSAY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael 11 Lindsay, of Dorsey & Whitney, for IEEE. 12 MR. EWING: Bruce Ewing, also of Dorsey & Whitney, for IEEE. 13 MR. WIGGINS: Jonathan Wiggins, your Honor. 14 15 MR. SCHUMACHER: I should mention, your Honor, 16 Mr. Lindsay has a pro hac vice motion pending before the 17 Court, so he would appear subject for and subject to your 18 Honor's approval of that motion. 19 THE COURT: I think there's no objection to that. 20 MR. SCHUMACHER: No, your Honor. And the same for 21 Mr. Vernon; he has one pending as well. 22 THE COURT: Very well. 23 MR. SCHUMACHER: Thank you, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Let's start with the first matter I want 25 to dispense with.

Obviously, the request for temporary restraints came into the Court on September 21st. Having taken a look at that, had some concerns with respect to jurisdiction, and I asked counsel to provide the Court with the supplemental support, and we did indeed receive that supplemental support by way of a letter, and the Court has reviewed that and is prepared to rule at this point in time.

As is well-settled, it must appear to be, to a legal certainty, that plaintiff's claims are really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. And whether plaintiff's claims pass the legal certainty standard is a threshold matter that should involve only minimal scrutiny of plaintiff's claims.

Further, the Court cannot consider the legal sufficiency of his claims -- or whether the legal theory he advances is likely unsound. Indeed, the threshold to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is lower than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

However, having reviewed plaintiff's letter-brief concerning this issue and, in particular, Dr. Xi's declaration, the Court finds that plaintiff has met its burden that the jurisdictional amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. In his declaration, Dr. Xi affirms, among other things, that his status as an IEEE fellow -- which is allegedly at risk of being removed -- is incredibly important. That designation

has resulted in a salary increase, as well as speaking and publishing opportunities. Dr. Xi makes around \$200,000 a year as a professor and receives an annual raise between 3 and 10 percent. Dr. Xi affirms that -- if he is expelled from the IEEE without a fair hearing and procedures pursuant to IEEE's bylaws and policies, he will lose his professorship.

Furthermore, Dr. Xi makes about \$20,000 per year in connection with consulting and speaking opportunities. These opportunities would also be lost because of the reputational damage from being expelled. Indeed, under the IEEE bylaws, it appears that the IEEE can publicly announce the circumstances surrounding any such expulsion. The Court finds this relevant especially because of the IEEE's alleged basis for potential expulsion -- in particular, theft or fraud.

In light of the materials submitted by plaintiff, the Court cannot say it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff's claims are less than \$75,000. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we will continue with today's proceeding, and we're going to really start with defense counsel.

I have a number of questions for defense counsel. So first, obviously, the parties have fully briefed the matter.

I did receive a reply brief last night, and I have reviewed the exhibits. I also advised counsel -- I believe in a text order -- that if you're going to be citing to any documents --

1 the exhibits were voluminous -- and, therefore, I expect 2 you're going to have a copy for whatever you're going to be 3 citing to for me as well as my law clerk. Okay? Let's start with defense counsel. I've got a number of 4 questions for defense counsel. I'll obviously allow 5 6 plaintiff's counsel to weigh in, when appropriate, but let's start with defense counsel here. 8 So I want to understand something because I'm having 9 trouble understanding the positions here. Does the current 10 constitution, bylaws, policies or operations manual of the 11 IEEE require a formal complaint under the current 12 circumstances? 13 MR. LINDSAY: Would your Honor prefer --14 THE COURT: Wherever Miss Monteleone can hear you. 15 That's all that matters to me. 16 MR. LINDSAY: Note, your Honor, the IEEE has created 17 a policy in which one member can complain about the conduct of 18 another member, but that is not the only method by which a 19 member can --THE COURT: Where does it say that? 20 21 MR. LINDSAY: That is in the constitution bylaws, 22 paragraph I-110, section 1 provides the statement, but a 23 member can be expelled for cause. Section 3 provides the 24 process by which a member can provide a complaint against 25 another member.

THE COURT: All right. When we sent -- when you sent a letter, exhibit A -- and the letter I'm referring to is exhibit A and this was accompanied to document 1 -- document which was the complaint filed on September 21st.

When your client sent a letter, your client referenced August 2nd letter, under bylaws section I-110.1: IEEE may expel, suspend or censure a member for cause as defined by the bylaws. The power may be exercised through a member complaint -- let me just move my Post-It here -- and member complaint to a hearing process of the IEEE Ethics and Member Conduct Committee, which would make a recommendation to the board of directors, or directly to the board of directors.

No complaint has been filed in this instance and, therefore, the procedures for a hearing by the IEEE Ethics and Member Conduct Committee do not apply. Nevertheless, the board has determined to ensure that it provides you with due process, that is an opportunity to be heard both for your sake and for the integrity of the board's decision-making process. Okay.

So I understand what 110 says. What I'd like to know is where -- because I don't see a citation in this letter -- either in this paragraph or the subsequent paragraph -- that references where you can proceed in the fashion that you are proceeding via ad hoc committee.

MR. LINDSAY: Okay. 110.1 is a statement and that

1 provides exhibit A.

2 THE COURT: Right. It's a cause. 110 is "Member,
3 Discipline and Support."

MR. LINDSAY: Right.

THE COURT: But then 110.1 defines what "cause" is.

6 MR. LINDSAY: Correct.

THE COURT: If cause exists and the member of IEEE may be expelled, suspended or censured for cause and then right there, 110.3 talks about our Ethics and Member Conduct Committee. But you said, we don't get to point 3 because you somehow are not viewing it as a member-to-member complaint, but as you say in your brief, on page -- on page 21, complaint from one member of another -- against another is when these bylaws would kick in and these procedures would kick in. But the bylaws do not -- and policies -- do not contemplate an instance in which the member's conduct is questioned by the IEEE management and board of directors.

I'd like to know where that -- that sounds like an escape clause to me or safety clause or some kind of loophole, and I just don't see where -- unless I'm missing it -- where that seems to say that.

MR. LINDSAY: So, if I may, I want to answer your

Honor's question, but the way we get there is that a

corporation in its -- specifically to its board of directors,

has the inherent authority to supervise its operations. One

of the things it knows it's going to face in an organization that has 423,000 members in 160 countries is the possibility of complaints between members. One member may say, of another member, that there is cause for this member to be disciplined in some fashion. IEEE simply provides a process that allows for that, and that's for a couple of reasons.

Number one, if you don't have a process, how are you going to handle complaints that come in; and number two, the ability of those members to resolve complaints between themselves at that lower level is enhanced if both sides know that there is a formal process that they will both have to go through if they want to proceed.

I believe it's also in 110.3, about the fourth paragraph, that says that a complaining member -- excuse me -- that the Ethics and Member Conduct Committee isn't required to proceed unless the complaining member agrees to appear at the hearing. In other words, if there is something built into that process where one member has a complaint against another, that there is a process through which both are going to be brought together.

THE COURT: Let's talk about that process. I think it's worth exploring it a little bit. So, again, you would say this is only applicable when one member complains of conduct of another member, right?

MR. LINDSAY: Correct.

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1	THE COURT: Yet the president, all its board of
2	directors, Miss Lack L is it L-A-C-K?
3	MR. LINDSAY: L-A-C-H.
4	THE COURT: Or Lack L-A-C-H Miss Lach are
5	they not members, in good standing, of the IEEE?
6	MR. LINDSAY: I do not believe Miss Lach is a member.
7	The presidents, yes, are all members.
8	THE COURT: They are all members?
9	MR. LINDSAY: Yes, they are.
10	THE COURT: So if indeed and only in those
11	circumstances where one member in good standing complains of
12	another member by the way, section 110, which let's be
13	clear again, is "Member Discipline and Support" entitled
14	"Member, Discipline and Support" the complaints against the
15	members must be reviewed by the ethics member conduct
16	committee to determine whether cause is present. Agreed?
17	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
18	THE COURT: So there's got to be a formal complaint
19	that's written, and the formal complaint that I understand has
20	to be served with an accompanying affidavit and executed by
21	the IEEE member in good standing, right?
22	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Agreed. And it also must be much like
24	our own process the complaint must be specific and attach

all relevant documents, correct?

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1	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
2	THE COURT: You agree with that?
3	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Great. So then the Ethics and Member
5	Conduct Committee must investigate and determine whether there
6	is a reasonable basis for believing facts in the complaint and
7	whether the facts constitute cause. So they do their
8	preliminary review. By the way, Ethics and Members Conduct
9	Committee, the president is not on there, correct?
10	MR. LINDSAY: Correct.
11	THE COURT: Can't be on there, correct?
12	MR. LINDSAY: Correct.
13	THE COURT: Right? And the board members can't be on
14	the EMCC I'm going to refer to it as the EMCC. Agreed?
15	MR. LINDSAY: Right.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Great. And it's no more than five
17	people on the EMCC?
18	MR. LINDSAY: I think that's correct, hearing panel I
19	think is five.
20	THE COURT: Hearing panel is five to nine.
21	MR. LINDSAY: Right.
22	THE COURT: So once the EMCC makes the determination
23	that perhaps there is cause, they then institute a formal
24	proceeding, correct?
25	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.

THE COURT: So when EMCC are not made of any board members -- that, I think, is important because they're insulating the board who has the ultimate decision, right? They're insulating the board from hearing facts that may not be facts and insulating the board from perhaps hearing other information that may not be relevant to the other information at hand, correct? There's a purpose of insulation, I would imagine, right?

MR. LINDSAY: That is part of it, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So the EMCC must memorialize its preliminary finding in writing, and it then transmits that memorialized finding to the IEEE president and its board of directors. So what the president and the board of directors then has to do is determine whether they're going to appoint this hearing board and, if so, they only have to vote by majority. The president and the board of directors decides, you know, we better get a hearing board empaneled. They only need to vote by majority, correct?

MR. LINDSAY: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So then the hearing board, which, again, as I understand it, it can't be the president or any BOD members -- and it has to be five to nine people that are obviously EEE -- IEEE voting members, and the hearing board then is entrusted with the responsibility -- obviously, appointing a date and time, the accused member has a right to

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appear before the hearing board and submit evidence. The hearing is held in confidence, and the accused can appear with or without a lawyer, but the hearing proceeds much like a trial does, correct?

MR. LINDSAY: Very similar.

THE COURT: All right. Then the hearing board convenes in executive session and the hearing board needs to vote, this time, by two-thirds of a vote?

MR. LINDSAY: Right.

THE COURT: To find cause, right? Are you with me so far? No -- you don't disagree with any of the process that I'm laying out? And if you do, please let me know, counsel. Okay?

MR. LINDSAY: Very good.

THE COURT: So the hearing board then places its determination in writing and that's a written report, it's forwarded to the board of directors. The board of directors then sets a time -- date and time to consider and the hearing board's recommendation and that -- they have to communicate to the charged member -- the member accused of some conduct or the member facing some form of discipline -- their date and time, and the charged member is given, yet again, another opportunity to submit, in writing, his comments or her comments and recommendations to the board.

The board of directors then -- who have been insulated

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from the process and only read the written report as it's been given to the hearing board, is free to make a final determination -- again, a two-thirds majority required -- and the sanctions cannot be more severe than the hearing board recommended. Right?

MR. LINDSAY: Right.

THE COURT: So we're all in agreement.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes.

THE COURT: So what you're saying to me, that these extremely detailed policies and mechanism of insulation and protection and a notice and due process, this only applies when one board member -- strike that -- when one IEEE member is accusing another IEEE of conduct unbecoming its membership or fellowship, and this process doesn't have to be followed if the board of directors thinks you committed some infraction, whether it be egregious or not?

MR. LINDSAY: No, that is not our claim, your Honor.

Our claim is that if the source of complaint is a member dispute -- that is member accusing other member -- then clearly all of those procedures that we've just been through must be followed. If the source of the complaint is not from a member, then you don't have the same kinds of institutional concerns that -- members basically trying to misuse the organization to gain an advantage for themselves.

In this case, the source -- the original source of the

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1	information that there was something potentially amiss was	the
2	receipt of a grand jury subpoena, complaint with the	
3	information of the U.S. Attorney's Office	
4	THE COURT: And by the way, when did you get that	
5	subpoena?	
6	MR. LINDSAY: I'm sorry?	
7	THE COURT: When did your client receive the	
8	subpoena?	
9	MR. LINDSAY: It was in mid-2015.	

THE COURT: It was as a result, according to your brief, your client then instituted an investigation, hired a forensic accounting firm?

13 MR. LINDSAY: Not immediately.

14 THE COURT: Well, when did they do that? I don't see 15 a date.

MR. LINDSAY: No -- initially -- the initial attempt was to simply comply with the subpoena.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LINDSAY: So that was one part. Simultaneous with that, though -- obviously, IEEE needed to figure out what is going on here, do we have an issue?

22 THE COURT: Right.

> That initially was followed -- the MR. LINDSAY: initial follow-up was through IEEE's internal accounting department, and during that investigation it became clear that

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1	the volume and complexity that the matter was going to be
2	too taxing for that department, and IEEE made the decision to
3	engage a forensic accountant.
4	THE COURT: When was that done? When was that done?
5	MR. LINDSAY: That was in November of 2016.
6	THE COURT: And according to your papers, at some
7	point in time it became aware of abnormalities, right?
8	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Sixty percent of the money that was
10	sought, that \$1,078,593.67 referenced on page 3, you found and
11	ultimately discovered that 60.9 percent of Dr. Xi's
12	reimbursements were inappropriate page 5 of your papers.
13	When did you become aware of that fact?
14	MR. LINDSAY: To be precise, your Honor, that 60
15	percent applies only to the one conference for which Dr. Xi
16	has submitted complete records.
17	THE COURT: 2014?
18	MR. LINDSAY: I'm sorry.
19	THE COURT: The 2014 conference?
20	MR. LINDSAY: That's 450-ish thousand dollars.
21	THE COURT: When did you become aware of the alleged
22	mis inappropriateness of the reimbursements?
23	MR. LINDSAY: The initial findings reported by Grant
24	Thornton were reported in January January of '17.
25	THE COURT: When did you notice him you were going to

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1	proceed with this format?
2	MR. LINDSAY: The board meets periodically during the
3	course of the year, and at the January and February meetings
4	the initial reports were prepared. Again, what Grant Thornton
5	reported in January was the initial findings, not the
6	completion of an investigation.
7	The decision to proceed in this fashion was debated as
8	one of several options at the board meeting at the very end of
9	June of this year.
10	THE COURT: And now you say time is of the essence?
11	MR. LINDSAY: Yes, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Okay. Let's get back to my original
13	question.
14	So because you argue specifically that the bylaws do
15	not contemplate an instance such as the one we're confronted
16	with now, they're free to create this ad hoc committee to
17	address a specific issue or activity that is not appropriate
18	to be addressed by an ongoing committee, correct?
19	MR. LINDSAY: Correct.
20	THE COURT: How is it that the EMCC is not
21	appropriate to address this issue? Is this not an issue of
22	conduct unbecoming a fellow or a member?
23	MR. LINDSAY: No, your Honor.
24	The primary issue you asked about the essence
25	time being of the essence. The primary driver at this point

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1	that an individual that has been accused of stealing hundreds
2	of thousands of dollars
3	THE COURT: No charges yet, correct?
4	MR. LINDSAY: Well, no
5	THE COURT: There's a grand jury investigation.
6	MR. LINDSAY: I'm sorry, no.
7	THE COURT: There are no charges yet?
8	MR. LINDSAY: There are no charges.
9	THE COURT: No indictment?
10	MR. LINDSAY: I have no knowledge of that, your
11	Honor.
12	THE COURT: So what are you obviously, it's not
13	that he's been charged?
14	MR. LINDSAY: Correct.
15	THE COURT: It's not that he's been found guilty?
16	MR. LINDSAY: Correct.
17	THE COURT: It's not that he's been pled guilty or
18	sentenced.
19	We now have what you received, which was a subpoena
20	and, arguably, a grand jury investigation, but what are the
21	charges that you are now seeking to expel this member? What
22	are you charging him with?
23	MR. LINDSAY: Stealing at least \$269,000 from IEEE.
24	THE COURT: Is that conduct what is the basis of
25	it? It's disciplinary conduct, right?

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1 MR. LINDSAY: Yes. 2 THE COURT: It's disciplinary conduct. It's perhaps 3 illegal --4 MR. LINDSAY: But it's not sourced from a member. 5 THE COURT: So you say the fact is that you do not 6 believe that the current EMCC that is entrusted in dealing 7 with this investigation in determining whether other charges by other IEEE members -- whether there's sufficient cause --9 you do not think that this situation would be appropriately 10 handled by the very committee in existence that deals with 11 disciplinary matters? 12 MR. LINDSAY: The committee that is in existence 13 deals with complaints that were made by one member of another. 14 Those complaints result in discipline. That does not mean 15 that the only way that the board can impose discipline is when 16 one member complains about another. 17 THE COURT: So why can't the president, Miss Lach --18 anybody -- why can't they file a complaint against Dr. Xi, 19 under the current circumstances? You have a forensic 20 analysis. You have evidence. You have, quite frankly, quite 21 a bit of information to support the allegations. Why would it 22 not be appropriate to pursue a complaint in this instance? 23 MR. LINDSAY: The question is not whether it would be 24 possible. The question is whether it is necessary in these 25 circumstances.

THE COURT: So, in other words -- and I think that, quite frankly, what concerns me, is, I think in his reply brief Dr. Xi makes a very good point, which is you all say that this isn't required, but you know what -- and it's on page 4 of the brief -- it says that IEEE's position seems to be that it can make up the rules as it goes along without regard for what the bylaws say. It does not allow fellows and members, such as Dr. Xi, any fair notice regarding what the rules are, and it clearly is not in the process outlined by the detailed bylaws and policies, to which Dr. Xi as well as every other member is -- receives and has to uphold at all times.

So, basically, you're saying that because now this is coming from a different avenue -- that being information that was derived by a subpoena request which led the president and the board of directors to investigate -- that you all are free to decide how you're going to proceed. How does that give adequate notice to members and fellows?

MR. LINDSAY: Your Honor, if I may, it was not a direction by IEEE to proceed. The decision to conduct the investigation was made by the legal department, legal and compliance department of IEEE. So I respond just because I want to emphasize that the source of this complaint is not one member complaining about something that another member has done, where that complaining member either had suffered a

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1	direct injury or believes that there is something that should
2	be happening.
3	THE COURT: So it's different because it came from
4	the legal department?
5	MR. LINDSAY: Yes. And because the same concerns
6	that you would have about potentials, for example, for
7	professional jealousies between two members do not arise in
8	that circumstance. I'm sorry
9	THE COURT: Okay. So is there anything in your
10	constitution, bylaws or policies anywhere that says to
11	me when it comes from the legal department you don't have to
12	follow the standards and procedures?
13	MR. LINDSAY: Well, the challenge in answering that
14	question, your Honor, which I want to do, is that it assumes
15	that the standard procedures apply regardless of the source of
16	the complaint. I cannot point to you some provision
17	THE COURT: Anything then.
18	MR. LINDSAY: for something that is not a
19	member-sourced complaint that these rules do not apply. I
20	cannot point to specific language for that. I can only go
21	back to 110.1, which does say a member can be expelled. 110.3
22	says what happens if there's a member-sourced complaint.
23	THE COURT: So these are only member-sourced
24	complaints?

MR. LINDSAY: Yes.

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THE COURT: So we guarantee our members and fellows all these protections, including insulating the body that will make determination. So you have adequate policies when there's a member complaining against another member, but when there's an issue involving the most serious sanction, that being expulsion, there are no safeguards in place for their members and fellows. In other words, when it comes from the legal department.

MR. LINDSAY: No, your Honor, that is not what I'm saying.

THE COURT: Well, what protections are there? What policies are we following?

Here we have a whole section that defines, in great detail, what you get. You get not only -- you get the opportunity to have the EMCC look at it to make a preliminary review, you get the opportunity to have -- to go to the board of directors to decide whether they're going to vote by majority to empanel a hearing board. You've got a hearing board that's insulated, that can't be the president or board of directors, that has to conduct a mini trial in which there are no 30-minute limits for opening statement or no 5,000-word limits on what you can present. Then you have, by the way, the ability for the hearing board to forward, after executive session, a recommendation. And guess what the member gets as well? The member gets another opportunity before the board to

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plead his or her case. All these protections when one memberis going after another.

But the board, in this instance, and the president, in this instance, can pretty much send him partial information about what the accusations are. I'm going to have to accept the complaint as it appears, right? I'm not picking one side or the other.

MR. LINDSAY: Right.

THE COURT: The Court is bound to accept the complaint as it appears, correct?

MR. LINDSAY: For purposes of a Rule 12 motion, that would be correct, your Honor. Not for purposes of a request of fact. That does have to be supported by affidavits.

THE COURT: Well, they have, if they've given me the affidavits I need, right?

MR. LINDSAY: Well, no. If the Court looks at both sides of the affidavits, the Court will find that there are some significant differences in facts. But on this specific point, no, the procedures -- which I think was your Honor's original question -- the board is providing the opportunity for Dr. Xi to be heard. They've provided the opportunity for him to submit information in defense, recognizing that even though he is a U.S. resident and has taught in an English-speaking university for decades, they've offered the

opportunity for a translator, if that was needed. They offered -- in essence, this is his chance to come forward.

At no point has IEEE said, and when you come forward you are absolutely forbidden from arguing that this procedure is improper and that your complaint -- that the complaint should be directed through the alternative procedure as if it were a member-sourced complaint. He's entirely free to make that argument within the IEEE system. So far he has not chosen to make that argument within the IEEE system.

THE COURT: Well, counsel, quite frankly, he's taking issue with your power and your client's ability to unilaterally now select an ad hoc committee that's made up of a president, who we know -- like it or not -- I think the information is before the Court -- that there have been presentations made, there has been slide shows made, there has been arguments made to the very people that are now ultimately supposed to hear him, keep their mind open. It sounds like they're not insulated from this process, as they would have been insulated had they followed the bylaws in a formal complaint.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes, your Honor, the implications of what you have just said is that a board of directors, which is charged of protecting the treasury of this nonprofit organization, should be completely shielded from information that one of its trusted volunteers has, over a decade-long

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period, has been stealing money from IEEE. That would be thoroughly irresponsible and a violation of the duties of the directors, their fiduciary duties under New York State law, to take care of the treasury of the organization.

So it cannot be the case that the board should not have received information about a significant problem -- and it's not the just the dollars of this one individual -- they have controls --

THE COURT: They could have received --

MR. LINDSAY: -- What do they need to do?

14 taken or not. I'm not interested in the merits right now.

And I understand that you have a \$6.4 million budget you're concerned that this man will be able to control come January 1st, 2018.

But what obviously is perplexing to me is the manner in which this information has come about. Because this information was well within the board of directors' and the president's knowledge when they received the subpoena over two years ago. And I think they had good, I think, reason and cause to pursue an investigation and pursue a forensic analysis of the information.

Where you lose me is that all of a sudden there doesn't

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seem to be the following of the very principles that are laid out in a constitution, its bylaws and policies, of which your client sent to him in the first place in the very first letter that prompted all of this.

So I understand fiduciary duties, counsel, but it's not like you were hit with this six days ago.

So let's continue.

Anything else you want to place on the record before I give the plaintiff an opportunity to supplement via oral argument? Anything you've raised?

Counsel, you're looking at me like somehow you're confused as to what I'm asking you to do. Why don't we go over your -- since I read it in great detail -- your positions, and if you want to supplement, you supplement.

So we basically start with the first proposition that this Court lacks standing because there's a failure somehow to exhaust the administrative remedies.

I can tell you, counsel, having reviewed the law in this case, I'm not really moved by this. The authority cited deals with federal agencies and, quite frankly, this has nothing to do with the APA. I'm not too concerned about the exhaustion. I also think it's a nonsensical proposition to argue that the very procedure you're implementing of which he takes issue with because it's contrary, in his opinion, to the very policies and procedures, he has to follow those

procedures in order to then exhaust those administrative
remedies. That doesn't make sense to me. And I, quite
frankly, don't need further argument on that.

Let's talk about irreparable harm being established.

I've read that, and I've read the exhibits. This was not the first step. This is your last chance. Come this day, if you don't come, we're making a decision, that decision is final and you can't appeal. It sounds kind of final to me.

Also, I'd like to hear you on the idea, and, quite frankly, the notion by plaintiff that you have certain rights under -- now, I assume that you say you wouldn't be doing this, but they seem to have an opportunity, if indeed there is cause found and decisions made by this ad hoc committee, that they could advise the membership immediately that he's being expelled.

MR. LINDSAY: I'm sorry, I missed the first part of that.

THE COURT: That indeed, after this final hearing --

MR. LINDSAY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and there was a determination made by the president, the president-elect and indeed the past-president, that they would have the ability, if they ruled accordingly, to advise membership of this expulsion, would they not?

MR. LINDSAY: They have the authority under the

1 | bylaws to do that, yes.

2 THE COURT: All right. So basic --

MR. LINDSAY: If there's a decision they will, in fact, do that.

THE COURT: Well, they pretty much indicated you show up and present the evidence or, if you don't, we're moving forward.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes. But moving forward does not mean -- well -- there needs to be some explanation of why Dr. Xi would not be assuming the presidency of the robotics society, which would be the context of his expulsion, but that statement doesn't have to be a -- you know -- a very long, detailed statement of the reasons.

So if your Honor is saying that there is some risk that Dr. Xi might suffer from public statements, that's a different issue from what happens with the decision making. And yes, it is true that if Dr. Xi -- what the letter says -- that if Dr. Xi does not show up, then the decision -- then the three presidents would make the decision at that time, and yes, that decision would be final. It doesn't tell you what the decision would be, but it does tell that you decision would be final.

THE COURT: So he's got to wait until you decide whether you're going to advise -- how do we unring that bell?

How does one unring that bell once you send notice to the bar

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1	to its members, rather?
2	MR. LINDSAY: If it's done.
3	THE COURT: If it's done, how do you unring that
4	bell?
5	MR. LINDSAY: Presumably, he files the same lawsuit.
6	THE COURT: Reputation's done, though, no? We have
7	to wait until you send a letter for there to be irreparable
8	harm?
9	MR. LINDSAY: For him to have suffered harm there has
10	to have been an adverse decision, which there hasn't been yet.
11	And your Honor is asking how big will that harm be, and the
12	answer is that's still within control.
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	MR. LINDSAY: And frankly, that's something where
15	IEEE has no desire to unnecessarily damage the reputation of
16	Dr. Xi. And, frankly, if this could have been done, you know,
17	privately, that would have been fine by IEEE, but that is not
18	the option that has been chosen by either side.
19	THE COURT: I think there was I think the letters
20	speak for themselves in that respect. I'll leave it at that.
21	Okay. If I'm not with you and I'm going to want
22	counsel for the plaintiff to address irreparable harm as to
23	the points raised in pages 14 and 15 of defense counsel's
24	opposition brief.
25	With respect to the current procedures being offered

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that are adequate, you say the process would be conducted in private, and you say that the defendant has received all the relevant documents as it relates to the charges, correct?

MR. LINDSAY: He has received those portions of the

presentation that relate to him, as opposed to any more general issues about IEEE accounting, internal controls.

THE COURT: All right. I don't think he agrees with you, but we'll hear him on that.

You then go on to say that -- obviously, plaintiff has not pointed -- on page 17 of your brief -- to any statutory or constitutional violations. You say that IEEE is a private actor. No violations of 5th or 14th amendment -- on page 18 of your brief, and no conflict of interest.

Finally, you say -- on page 19 of your brief -- that the bylaws and constitution provide for -- provide IEEE with the authority to provide its ad hoc disciplinary committee, which it already has, and you already indicate who the members of that committee are.

Anything else that you want to address with respect to your opposition, your points, or address any other points raised during our dialogue this afternoon?

MR. LINDSAY: No, I think that's it, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Great.

MR. LINDSAY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel.

1 MR. VERNON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I may interrupt you as well. I apologize to both sides, but I'm the kind of person that likes to cut to the chase and get to the issue at hand here.

The problem we have here, they seem to say this is a member-to-member issue, this policy, this bylaw, which I agree with you is rather detailed and affords members and fellows great protection when it's one member complaining about another member. And I agree with you that -- you know -- I was even surprised to hear that the accused member gets another bite at the apple even after a full trial and after a decision to, again, argue his or her position and what would be the appropriate sanction.

It is a rather detailed process and I'm hearing, as wonderful as it sounds, your client is not afforded those protections because this did not come to them via a complaint of a member in good standing but, instead, came out of the legal department and deals with an issue with respect to siphoning of funds and other conduct that is unbecoming, obviously, a member and future president of this association.

MR. VERNON: Okay.

THE COURT: So is that the case? Does all this go out the window because it came through the legal department, because they believe that time is of the essence, exigent circumstances warranted, and they have the ability, based on

their position, to appoint this ad hoc committee and they're not doing anything wrong? What say you?

MR. VERNON: No, your Honor, they don't have the power to do this because there's nothing in the constitution or bylaws that permits them to do this, and there are things in the constitution and bylaws that specifically speak to the process that has to be followed, and I think that's one of the issues that the Court identified.

The process that you detailed is important, and it's specifically important here because the EMCC -- I'm sort of borrowing your use of the acronym -- is tasked with determining whether there is cause to dismiss someone. They claim in their letter that they believe there may be cause. The EMCC is the body or committee that the bylaws say has to make that determination.

And I know they cited to a portion of the constitution, for example, that gives them the power to establish committees, but in section 8 of the constitution, it specifically says you can designate committees as set forth in the bylaws and constitution, which is what the bylaws do; they designate this Ethics and Member Conduct Committee.

The other argument they've made is they have this general power to create an ad hoc committee, but the language that they left out, it says, only to the extent not appropriate -- appropriate -- I'm sorry -- to be addressed by

an ongoing committee. And this is bylaw I-304.

So, again, we submit, that this is a matter that would be appropriately addressed by the Ethics and Member Conduct Committee.

The reason that this process is so important, especially to Dr. Xi in this situation, is that it protects somebody from loose statements and innuendoes forming the statement for discipline. This discipline -- and we detail this in the affidavit and our brief -- would completely destroy Dr. Xi's life work.

Now, Miss Lach made the comment that he stole a million dollars from the organization. Counsel and one of the defendants, who, as we mentioned in our brief, is also on this supposed presidential committee, has said he's stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars. And Dr. Xi said, What are you referring to? What specifics are you referring to? They refused to give him any information. And I think --

THE COURT: I just heard counsel a minute ago that you've gotten all the information, and you're on notice.

So here is where I was reading the briefs and saying, are these two ships passing in the night? Has your client received the accusations as well as the supporting documentation to best put him, one, on notice, and help him defend against this should this Court put you on notice?

25 MR. VERNON: Absolutely not.

THE COURT: What did you receive?

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MR. VERNON: All we received was the letter, the August 2nd letter that informed us of the charges, generally speaking, and the exhibits that they attached to their brief, which are portions of the Power Point presentation and a very small portion of the Grant Thornton report. And as we point out in our letter in response to them, one, the exhibits don't give any specifics, the Grant Thornton part -- the Grant Thornton report -- I'm sorry -- is particularly concerning because they've redacted things like employee interviews, there's a section -- you can tell this from the cover of the report, it has the table of contents, things like culture, IEEE culture, which, as we've submitted and others have said, Dr. Xi's practice of submitting receipts -- and this is what he's told them all along -- is consistent with what others have done. And this is where we run into this issue here. The only information we received is attached to their response.

As we sit here today, even though we filed the complaint in our motion, you have -- there were allegations there were three flights to Hong Kong in a week, one duplicative reimbursement and his post conference expenses, which were to be expected, but they were too high. That's the information they've given us.

What did the receipts actually say on them? What did

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1 the explanatory notes that Dr. Xi's office submitted with the 2 receipts say? Did he change his changed travel plans? Were 3 these for student volunteers? Was this where we had to block 4 book a hotel for the entire stay of the conference? 5 this --6 THE COURT: Where was the information regarding the 7 allegations? How was that presented to your client? In what form? 9 MR. VERNON: Just in the form of this letter. So it 10 was not sworn, it didn't have any of the information stating 11 what bylaw was allegedly violated. It was just what they've 12 attached to the response to their brief, which is the August 13 2nd letter, the two portions of a Power Point presentation 14 which we discovered --15 THE COURT: You didn't get the total Power Point 16 presentation? 17 MR. VERNON: No. 18 THE COURT: You got a letter and some conduct 19 referenced in the August 2nd letter? 20 MR. VERNON: Yes. 21 THE COURT: And you've got the allegations contained 22 in the opposition brief? 23 MR. VERNON: Yes, that's it. And as I said --24 THE COURT: You got portions of the Grant Thornton 25 report?

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1	MR. VERNON: Yes.
2	THE COURT: You say they're redacted.
3	MR. VERNON: There are significant portions missing.
4	THE COURT: This isn't enough notice for your client?
5	MR. VERNON: Our client still doesn't know what he's
6	been accused of doing and his office when I say "his
7	office" it was his secretary submitted probably
8	thousands of receipts over a few-year span with explanatory
9	notes, which they IEEE acknowledges in their response
10	and then a conference treasurer received all of that
11	information and approved it at the time.
12	So we've Dr. Xi I say "we" Dr. Xi provided the
13	receipts and notes saying this is what the receipt was for.
14	And somebody from IEEE read it and approved it.
15	What they're saying now is there seems to be some
16	anomalies they haven't even told us what receipts are
17	involved. Dr. Xi doesn't know how to respond.
18	THE COURT: They say you have a right to briefing.
19	MR. SCHUMACHER: We don't even know what to put in a
20	brief. They haven't given us briefs, the sworn statement
21	right now what they've identified in a brief, I don't think
22	that's theft. It's certainly not theft of a million dollars,
23	and it's certainly not theft of \$200,000. We haven't been
24	given information which can even support such a base claim
25	about somebody. So we can't respond.

THE COURT: What about responding -- we would note that you've been given 5,000 words, approximately 10 pages single-spaced. You've also got -- isn't that enough to respond to what you have? What are you responding to?

MR. VERNON: The best we can do is provide the response -- there's nothing to respond to substantively. The best we can do is provide the response to the procedure they've proposed, and I think the Court has picked up on the many problems we have with that. And we provided that response by way of letter which is attached to our brief as exhibit E, and that is our August 29th letter where we raised a number of these concerns.

So -- first of all, we don't have a sworn complaint. We don't have the documentary support that would go with the complaint. We don't have any explanation of what procedure we've allegedly violated. The only information we have is that they think there was one duplicative reimbursement -- things that the IEEE approved many years ago and that we gave them all the information at the time. And they haven't even given us the specifics about the actual receipts, so we don't have the information to respond to.

THE COURT: So let me ask you a question that I find curious. So one thing counsel keeps talking about, the member-to-member protection, the need so that one member might try to disparage another member for an economic benefit, you

know, that idea. Do you accept that the bylaws as written and the protections as included in the constitution bylaws and policies? Do you say that that is only exclusively protection afforded to a member-to-member accusation?

MR. VERNON: No, not at all. There's a specific section in the bylaws that deals with member discipline. They said in the letter they want to discipline this member and determine if there's cause to discipline him. So they're referring to the bylaws -- I want to say when it suits them but it sounds too ad hominem. They're referring to the bylaws when it suits what they want to do, but they disregard what we say are the most important part of them.

THE COURT: Well, they're saying that they're authorized -- assuming that I buy that they're authorized and there's something specifically, at the moment, they've been able to cite to me -- which I haven't seen -- I somewhat see it's silent, that this wasn't contemplated when the bylaws were written.

Let's talk about the adequacy. That's what we've been doing. So you say you don't really have specific notice as to what the accusations and allegations are?

MR. VERNON: Yes.

THE COURT: You say that in order for you to reply in this 5,000-word, approximately 10 pages, response to them -- and that's your right to briefing in total -- that you don't

even know what to respond to because you're not on notice exactly to what specific allegations there are. You've also been -- counsel says, on page 7 of their opposition -- you have a right to submit documentary evidence. And again, you would say that you don't know what document -- you provided evidence to them. You've cooperated, you say, in the process of this forensic analysis, and I do believe there was some notation that your client may have even been interviewed in this process. But you say, again, in order for you to know what to submit and how to combat and how to confront the allegations, you got to know what they all are, of which you say you don't, right?

MR. VERNON: Yes.

THE COURT: You have a right to an oral statement of 30 minutes and you have a right to a translator. That's not adequate?

MR. VERNON: No.

18 THE COURT: Why?

MR. VERNON: Because we still don't know what the allegations are. We still don't have -- they gave us an ultimatum, which is either submit to their process or don't show up and you're going to be expelled. If you submit to their process you're waiving all the rights that are available under the bylaws, which is a sworn complaint, an unbiassed body looking at the facts that is familiar with looking at the

facts because --

THE COURT: What about what counsel said the fiduciary duty that the president has to its membership, that they had to have been privy to some of these allegations and that there's nothing wrong with them, obviously, you know, abiding by and following through with their fiduciary duties?

MR. VERNON: They also have a fiduciary duty to follow their bylaws because that's the contract with the memberships, that's the constitution, and that forms one of the allegations in our complaint. Because they briefed that as it relates to Dr. Xi, and, frankly, that's something all members are interested in protecting because that is their pact with the organization.

THE COURT: Let's talk about irreparable harm. Counsel says it's not right.

MR. VERNON: They've given us an ultimatum, it's you waive what you think are your rights, not appealable. You show up, this is your one and only chance, 5,000 words. -- you may get to say a few things but, by the way, it's not adversarial, so you don't need to bring a lawyer.

THE COURT: You have a right to a lawyer, apparently.

MR. VERNON: They also said you can't file a lawsuit because these bylaws are not enforceable by law. I take offense to the way they tried to railroad Dr. Xi. That's a false statement, that the bylaws are not enforceable.

Then they said, If you file a complaint we're going to file a counterclaim and make a lot of these accusations public, which we submit are unfounded. But -- and, I'm sorry, I just veered off the answer to your question, which is irreparable harm.

They gave us the ultimatum, either you do one, you waive rights and submit to our procedure with this presidential committee that has already heard all these bad facts, or you don't show up and you're expelled.

In the first instance, this by definition, that's irreparable harm because we've given up rights, we've given up our ability to appeal, to object. We actually have objected by letter, and we asked them not to hold the hearing, and they refused. They said they're going forward. And then, on the other hand, we have irreparable harm because the argument they seem to be making is, let us make the decision, let us expel you from the organization.

They've actually already convened a meeting for August 29th, a special meeting, and my guess is that that was to make an announcement about this issue, which has my client fearful.

THE COURT: I think it's probably best that we not speculate as to what they were going to do on August 29th.

MR. VERNON: But he --

THE COURT: Do we have to wait for them to decide?

Do we have to wait for them to decide what they're going to

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1	do? Is your client does he have an obligation to wait
2	until injury occurs in this case?
3	MR. VERNON: No, because you can't and the
4	expression you used is apt because you can't "unring that
5	bell." Once you come out and expel somebody and say they're
6	not a member and they lose their distinguished status and
7	they're not going to be president because they stole X amount
8	of dollars and he didn't have an opportunity to object and
9	he didn't have the opportunity to appear before all the
10	unbiassed committees and the procedures, the damage is already
11	done. Please forgive me, I don't remember my client's age,
12	but he can't go back and rebuild the last so many years.
13	THE COURT: He's been a member since 1989, did he
14	not?
15	MR. VERNON: Yes.
16	THE COURT: He became a fellow in 2007, did he not?
17	MR. VERNON: Yes.
18	THE COURT: He became a fellow, and wasn't easy to
19	become a fellow, was it?
20	MR. VERNON: Not at all.
21	THE COURT: Your letter to them on August 29th
22	they make a point in saying, you know, we've done this once
23	before. This is a process we have done before and it's been
24	unchallenged. Does that move the ball for them in any way?
25	MR. VERNON: Not at all. And after seeing the way

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1 that they approached -- the way they wanted to force this
2 proceeding on Dr. Xi, I do feel sorry for a member that's
3 submitted to this procedure before because they certainly
4 didn't have to.

THE COURT: But your client put in writing that he's not submitting to this proceeding, correct?

MR. VERNON: Correct.

THE COURT: August 29th he says, this letter serves as Dr. Xi's notice to the IEEE that he intends to assert his rights under the IEEE constitution bylaws and policies, that he is prepared to seek judicial intervention if you refuse to recognize those rights.

This was your client's notice that he, indeed, was invoking the protection of the constitution as well as the bylaws and policies, correct?

MR. VERNON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So it's of no moment that we don't know whether that individual that obviously was required -- adhered to these -- to this ad hoc committee, potentially, whether that person, he or she, asserted their rights?

MR. VERNON: No.

THE COURT: But your client is?

MR. VERNON: It wasn't right then, and it isn't right

now.

25 THE COURT: Anything else that you want to address in

1 terms of either the issues raised either in oral argument or
2 in the briefing?

Let me just say, counsel -- let's talk about one thing, though.

MR. VERNON: Sure.

THE COURT: There's a great concern that there's potentially criminal charges that may soon come down against your client. There is a concern that he has the ability to manage \$6.4 million. What are we doing with that?

MR. VERNON: Well, your Honor -- and again, this is why speculation and innuendo should not be allowed to influence the process.

My understanding, on a careful reading of the brief, that a grand jury -- they were served with a grand jury subpoena, a portion of which asks for certain documents which may be relating to Dr. Xi. I can submit to the Court that we have no information that's the case.

It's -- it is strictly -- there was apparently -- we haven't seen it, obviously -- some request made for some information relating to something about Dr. Xi. That is not enough to say, grand jury subpoenas are served all the time requesting a lot of information about a lot of people and companies. They haven't said he's the target, which I think is telling, and there's been no evidence of anything coming from that.

We do know that it appears that the feds will monitor, at times, relationships between entities and Chinese entities as well. So whether it relates to somebody in China or Hong Kong, I'm not sure. We have no information that there's anything pending or coming for Dr. Xi, anything that submits that he's done something wrong.

THE COURT: There is no -- I was looking -- and again, you all have had the benefit of reading all these documents and I've done my best to catch up. There doesn't seem to be a time frame in which, if indeed they were required to follow the bylaws and the procedures set forth in those bylaws and policies, there doesn't seem to be a time frame that all of this has to occur, right? I mean, in fairness -- in fairness -- they could institute the very procedures laid out in 110.2, .3, .4 and .5, and if they did that, arguably, it can be done in the next few month, could it not?

MR. VERNON: If they were to prepare the complaint then the Ethics and Member Conduct Committee could determine whether there's any issue with the timeliness, and I think there are provisions in there to protect the members that say after a certain period of time -- I think it's maybe two years -- the ethics committee may decide you're not going to proceed on a time basis.

THE COURT: In other words, this doesn't seem to -for example, there isn't a requirement that the charged member

1 be given 60 days to respond or 30 -- I mean this all can
2 happen rather expeditiously?

MR. VERNON: It can if they want to.

THE COURT: Which can be problematic. One thing they say, obviously, there are members -- it's international, so in order to get these members together and convene special meetings, that it is not simply done -- there are a number of schedules and time -- obviously, time zones, et cetera, to be concerned about.

MR. VERNON: They made a presentation to the board in January, and as the Court pointed out, they were not in any great rush to act. And to send us a letter on August 2nd, and say that his one and final shot is September 28th, I think that's completely unreasonable, given the amount of time they had to look at these allegations.

THE COURT: Counsel, you seem to be asking for two different remedies, and I'm trying to understand what you're seeking.

In your order -- well, you seem to seek an order compelling IEEE to follow bylaws but, actually, in its proposed -- in your proposed order you basically are asking to hold off on the 9/28 hearing. What are you looking for here from me?

MR. VERNON: The immediate relief is to certainly hold off on the 9/28 hearing because it's something that we

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1 think -- I mean there's irreparable harm that can happen. 2 It's not going to be a fair proceeding, given what's required 3 in the bylaws. So, yes, there's a request that this 28th hearing not happen, and there's also a request that they be 4 5 ordered to follow their bylaws. 6 THE COURT: Do I have the authority to order them to 7 follow their bylaws? 8 MR. VERNON: One of the things we asked for in the 9 complaint is the declaration that the bylaws apply to this 10 situation. Whether that's something you would address at the 11 TRO stage or at a later stage --12 THE COURT: Probably a later stage. 13 MR. VERNON: I don't have the authority to tell a 14 judge something --15 THE COURT: No, no, I want you all to tell me when 16 you think I don't have the authority to do something, and, 17 obviously, I want you to use this time to tell me what it is 18 you're relying on. 19

The problem I have, right now I am faced with what feels like a moving target from the defense. It's silent. It doesn't say, we can't do it, this is only member-to-member charging. There's just an uneasiness that I feel in allowing, quite frankly, the hearing to go on the 28th, I'll be very honest, and I'll lay out my ruling in a moment. But I am not sure that I have the authority to order them to follow the

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bylaws, but that's something we'll have to address at a later point in time. But for the time being, I'm prepared to issue a ruling, if either side wants to place anything else on the record.

MR. VERNON: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes, your Honor. I do want to put a few more things on the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LINDSAY: First, the suggestion that Dr. Xi does not know the nature of the allegations against him is simply incorrect. We offer two reasons.

Number one, they continually cite to an alleged statement by IEEE general counsel Eileen Lach that he was accused of stealing a million dollars. They don't identify their source for that. They simply say, we know this. We assume it's an unauthorized disclosure that was present during a executive session of the board. But, in any event, that statement is demonstrably false because the documents from the meeting -- the meeting that they claim she made that statement at -- said that the amount he was reimbursed for, total, was \$1 million. And nobody ever suggested that every single penny that Dr. Xi was reimbursed for was a misappropriation. That's clearly not true.

THE COURT: But tell me where the notice -- the notice, where this man, that was a member of your organization

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1	since 1989, and a fellow since 2007, tell me the notice you're
2	giving this man so he can adequately prepare a defense to the
3	charges? What are you citing to?
4	MR. LINDSAY: I invite your attention to exhibit A to
5	our motion in opposition.
6	THE COURT: You're supposed to have a copy for me.
7	MR. LINDSAY: I do, your Honor.
8	(Document handed to the Court.)
9	THE COURT: Okay. This is a chart.
10	MR. LINDSAY: And that chart, your Honor, shows
11	it's a graphical representation that shows different kinds of
12	problems in the
13	THE COURT: Where does it say what's the problem
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15	MR. LINDSAY: It shows if you look at the key in
16	the upper left-hand corner, it shows conflicting dates and
17	locations. So, for example, on the bottom of page 8, center
18	right, you will see that Dr. Xi obtained reimbursement for a
19	flight on October 27, from Beijing to Taipei, and on October
20	28th, from Beijing to Detroit, indicating that, you know,
21	there's is a problem, he couldn't have been going to two
22	places in approximately that same time.

23 You will also see, I believe we gave another example in 24 our brief --25 THE COURT: No, no, no. I want to know what he was

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1	given to prepare for this hearing.
2	MR. LINDSAY: He was given this, your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Okay. So this outlines very clearly for
4	him what the problems are?
5	MR. LINDSAY: It illustrates the problems, yes, your
6	Honor. Then, if I may invite your attention to exhibit C, in
7	that same notebook
8	THE COURT: Mr. Vernon, I'm going to want you to
9	address this, okay?
10	MR. VERNON: Yes.
11	MR. LINDSAY: Exhibit C identifies it totals up
12	and, again, this is for the one conference this is all that
13	IEEE had the papers to complete an analysis for because Dr. Xi
14	continues not to have submitted the documentation.
15	But in any event
16	THE COURT: Let's stop you there. So are you
17	alleging that he is uncooperative?
18	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
19	THE COURT: So is that another allegation that will
20	be lodged against him?
21	MR. LINDSAY: It's not an allegation that will be
22	lodged against him, no, your Honor. It's the absence of paper
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24	THE COURT: So tell me counsel, you are a very
25	skilled lawyer. I would like you to tell me please list

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1	for me all of the allegations that Mr. Xi is going to have to
2	respond to.
3	MR. LINDSAY: The allegations are that he has
4	improperly obtained reimbursement for expenses during the
5	period 2008 to 2015. The summary of how those reimbursed
6	expenses were categorized appears in exhibit C to the
7	complaint, which, again, was provided to the plaintiff.
8	THE COURT: So all of the expenses submitted here
9	were improperly submitted and reimbursed?
10	MR. LINDSAY: No, your Honor. In exhibit C, it
11	distinguishes between those are inappropriate receipts and
12	those that are the remaining receipts.
13	THE COURT: Tell me where. All of them?
14	MR. LINDSAY: Exhibit C.
15	THE COURT: I'm on there.
16	MR. LINDSAY: Does your Honor have chart 4?
17	THE COURT: I'm here. All of these are the
18	inappropriate ones?
19	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
20	THE COURT: So it's 1.9 million?
21	MR. LINDSAY: No, your Honor. That's not the correct
22	page number
23	MR. EWING: Page 18, very small
24	MR. LINDSAY: It's the fine print at the right-hand
25	part of the chart.

-Temporary	Restraining	ງ Order-
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1	THE COURT: Eighteen, okay. So it's the \$183,147?
2	MR. LINDSAY: No, those those are the receipts to
3	which there is no question. If you look above that
4	THE COURT: This is what he was given to decipher,
5	with nothing in writing? This is what he was given to figure
6	it out?
7	MR. LINDSAY: Yes.
8	THE COURT: These are the read
9	MR. LINDSAY: This is what he was given, as well as
10	the letter; yes, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: I'm having trouble following you. Okay.
12	Continue making your record.
13	MR. LINDSAY: If you look at that page, you'll see
14	the total for this one conference of 474,000 and change for
15	reimbursement, and then it details the categories of problems
16	within his receipts. So, for example, the conflicting dates
17	and locations that I just provided, that accounts for 4.1
18	percent of his receipts, duplicative reimbursed accounts for
19	3.2 percent. Before ICRA, so in other words, excluding
20	meetings that it's clear that he shouldn't been attending
21	accounts for 29 percent, and meetings that, or expenses that
22	were incurred after the conference accounted for 24 percent of
23	the total receipts. And that's where we get to the issue of
24	the volume of receipts, for which there's clearly an issue.

Second point that I want to make clear -- I do want to

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be clear on one point, there's been some argument as to the finality or appealability of the decision of the IEEE board of directors. Regardless of whether the process is the process that IEEE has set forth for this matter or the member-originating complaint, member conduct committee process, the decision of the board of directors is final.

Now, if someone wants to say that despite the finality of that decision I am going to bring a lawsuit, they're free to say that, but the difference in finality -- there's no difference in finality as between those.

THE COURT: Yeah, well, the finality as laid out in the bylaws allow for there to be a process in which the member -- or the accused member to, obviously, hear all the evidence, have the evidence presented in a trial, be able to present it to an insulated body, not the board of directors or the president. It allows for safeguards, and it allows the process to play out.

If, in the end, the board of directors decides that based on what the hearing board had written in a formal report after again hearing from the accused member, they decide that expulsion is the appropriate remedy and stripping him of his title of becoming president and everything else, you're right, but that's after the process has played out.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes, there is a difference in process. But either way, it gets to a final decision by the board of

directors because that's the top-most decision maker within the organization.

Mr. Vernon has also raised questions about the grand jury subpoena. We had been attempting to cooperate and maintain the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings, but given a choice between protecting that confidentiality and exercising our rights to protect IEEE, I have to choose IEEE, and I will disclose that, yes, the subpoena concerned Dr. Xi and only Dr. Xi. There was nothing else. It's all about Dr. Xi.

We inquired whether, frankly, whether IEEE was a target. No, IEEE was not a target. The only target of that grand jury subpoena was Dr. Xi. And so I need to offer that to put this into context for your Honor as to why IEEE has chosen to proceed the way it has.

Now, yes, I do not know what the conclusion of the FBI's investigation is going to be. I do not know what decisions the grand jury will make. That's not our province, and that is not what is driving IEEE's decision-making.

Whatever the grand jury does, it will do, and on whatever schedule it determines, but what is driving us is the importance of the role that Dr. Xi proposes to play within our organization.

Your Honor also indicated some inclination to issue a temporary restraining order. We want to hear exactly what

language it is and exactly what IEEE would be restrained from doing, but we also wanted to raise the question of the bond, and the amount of the bond, of course, will depend upon exactly what it is IEEE is being restrained from doing.

THE COURT: Well, let's hear you on it. What would be the appropriate bond? I'll tell you what I'm contemplating, counsel --

MR. LINDSAY: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- I'm contemplating, obviously, enjoining IEEE from having this hearing on the 28th, and I, quite frankly, was going to ask the next question, which would be what, if any, discovery would be necessary to move this matter toward the preliminary injunction? And, ultimately, you may decide that, one, in light of the temporary restraints, that you're going to go back and follow the bylaws that need to be followed. I don't know if I can compel you to do that at this time, but it probably would make a whole heck of a lot of sense to do that, but that's up to you and, obviously, IEEE. But if a formal complaint -- which could be easily, in my opinion, based on what I read, be provided, that provides notice, proper notice, not color-coded charts that tell him to figure it out, but that tells him what exactly he's done, one, that warrants complete expulsion from the organization, of which, again, is your right to do. But I think that we have to see what the allegations are and whether

the sanctions merit the allegations, whether you intend on stripping him of his title, et cetera. But it would be nice to know exactly what you're claiming he did, whether it be conduct unbecoming a member or fellow, whether it is indeed theft, whether you are accusing him of misappropriation of IEEE funds. Let's lay it out. Let him know what those charges are, and then let the process play out.

If that were to happen before I ever had the ultimate preliminary injunction, that's fine. That's up to you. But based on what you're telling me in terms of fiduciary responsibilities, there are things that we can do to protect IEEE, and that would be something that you would work out with my magistrate judge at a later point in time. These things take a lot longer than, again, all parties would like, that being before the January 1st, 2018 date that he assumes the presidency of the subcommittee, for lack of a better way of saying it.

So I'm willing to work with you. For now, we're not going to have the hearings. We're going to give the parties the time to get the necessary discovery. Give them the unredacted forensic analysis. Let him see what people are saying he did, and we'll take it from there. I, again, question -- I question what authority I do have, and that will be for briefing at another time.

Do we want safeguards? Do we want bond? Let's talk

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about it. What would be the appropriate bond, based on what
you're saying?
MR. LINDSAY: Again, it depends on what your Honor is
going to restrain IEEE from doing. If we separate this into
three categories, there is the membership in IEEE, there is
the IEEE fellowship, there's the presidency of Robotics and
Automation Society. For those first two, I'm not going to
tell you that there's some threat of irreparable harm to IEEE,
other than damage to its own reputation should the allegations
indeed be true.
THE COURT: I can't put a number on that.
MR. LINDSAY: We're concerned about that third
category.
THE COURT: Huh?
MR. LINDSAY: We're concerned about that third
category.
THE COURT: So what are you saying?
MR. LINDSAY: So if your Honor's order is that IEEE
is restrained from proceeding as to those first two items,
then we don't believe any bond would be necessary.
If your Honor's order is that IEEE is restrained from
taking actions that would either suspend or remove him from
the presidency position, that's a different matter because
that's the role that has the financial responsibility in it.
THE COURT: What's the bond.

1	MR. LINDSAY: \$1 million.
2	THE COURT: How do you justify it?
3	MR. LINDSAY: Because the budget is the annual
4	expenditures are \$6 million and that's, you know, a number we
5	believe would be a reasonable number given the risks.
6	THE COURT: Why can't there be mechanisms put in
7	place for an independent financial audit, an independent
8	financial representative that would be working with Dr. Xi
9	if in the event you don't get what you need to get done in
10	time to take appropriate action?
11	MR. LINDSAY: That's why I was asking about exactly
12	what your Honor is restraining IEEE from doing; because if
13	your Honor restrains IEEE from taking any action whatsoever
14	with respect to that, then that's where the damage arises.
15	THE COURT: No, no
16	MR. LINDSAY: If your Honor's order doesn't
17	THE COURT: I, quite frankly, think if you follow the
18	bylaws that's what I asked counsel, Mr. Vernon, a moment
19	ago.
20	There doesn't seem to be a timetable. I don't know.
21	He may come back and say they're trying to do this in a week.
22	But, obviously, if you follow the bylaws and at that point in
23	time that we have a problem that there's been some evidence
24	that's been shared with the board of directors as well as the
25	president and I'm not sure, quite frankly, that you're

going to be able to follow the bylaws if indeed there's been evidence -- and that discovery will bear out, I assume -- that they've insulated themselves from this process as it was contemplated by the bylaws. That's a separate issue that we'll have to discuss at a later point in time.

But I certainly -- I'm not inclined at this point in time -- maybe this is a point for preliminary injunction hearing to enjoin you all from seeking appropriate action -- what you all think is appropriate action against Dr. Xi, but I certainly won't be allowing you to do it on Thursday.

MR. LINDSAY: All right. I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel, I'm hearing \$1 million is the appropriate bond. What do you say?

MR. VERNON: Your Honor, I don't think a bond is appropriate in these circumstances. And I think I heard counsel say that he agrees, except to the extent they're restrained from -- from having Dr. Xi take over the presidency.

Conceptually, they're making assumption he is going to do something wrong, which I have some difficulty with, but I agree with the Court that we could put some sort of measure in place to monitor the accountability of what he's doing with his budget. That would be far more appropriate than a million-dollar bond, which is almost punitive and inappropriate under the circumstances near. But I think the

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    organization is well-equipped to put some process or person in
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    place to keep an eye on the budget, and I know Dr. Xi would
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    not have an issue with that, if it means they're not going to
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    say, We doing this because he stole a million dollar.
    something we'll deal with later.
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             THE COURT:
                         I'm going to want to recess on the issue
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    of a bond. It wasn't raised in the papers, was it?
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             MR. LINDSAY: No, your Honor.
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             MR. VERNON:
                          No.
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             THE COURT: And I don't like surprises.
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    future, if we're going to raise issues, raise them in the
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    papers. Supplement them, if you need to, but I would prefer
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    not to be surprised at oral argument.
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           Let me break a second, consider what I heard, and then
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    I'll come out.
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             THE CLERK: All rise.
17
                              (Recess.)
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             THE COURT: Counsel, I do have a question for you,
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    Mr. Vernon.
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           Mr. Vernon, what's the next step, in your mind?
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             MR. VERNON: Can I approach?
             THE COURT: Please.
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             MR. VERNON: So the request is for the order
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    preventing them from holding a hearing. I know the Court
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    mentioned discovery relating to an injunction hearing, but
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there aren't any fact -- the discovery we would ask for would really be what they would include in the complaint, which I assume would be coming pursuant to the bylaws and procedures; and it wouldn't even be appropriate for the injunction because the Court isn't deciding, in the injunction, whether Dr. Xi has committed these acts or improper receipts.

So unless -- we're asking that the hearing not be allowed to proceed -- that they're enjoined --

THE COURT: All right. Let's start from square -- let's start from -- I've already indicated to you that, at least for now, the Court is going to enjoin IEEE from conducting this hearing on the 28th.

MR. VERNON: Yes.

THE COURT: That's the immediate restraint you sought, and that's what you're going to get, and I'll support my ruling in a moment. But my question is, what's next?

There's an issue of a bond, which I'm going to require supplemental briefing on it because it was just raised today. Fine. There's also what happens next.

Now, assuming -- assuming that IEEE decides that they're going to issue a formal complaint, and then your client receives a formal complaint and they begin to follow that which we outlined earlier when we started today, what's next for the Court to have to decide?

MR. VERNON: I anticipated that question and thought

about it. My -- I anticipate that if they initiate that proceeding the only real issue remaining here would potentially be damages for the breach of fiduciary duty, but I think this case would get resolved as to those issues, probably without prejudice, as that other proceeding takes place. Otherwise, this case -- there would be a motion, a dispositive motion on the issue of whether we can get a declaration that they're required to follow the bylaws.

So if the case is not resolved by them initiating their proceedings under the bylaws, then I anticipate there would be -- likely be a dispositive motion on the issue of the declaration.

THE COURT: Because, again, the issue of whether this

Court could require them to follow the bylaws -- right -- I

mean that's an issue that obviously still has to be briefed.

I think that counsel has argued -- and obviously I'm

paraphrasing here -- but he's arguing that the source matters

-- right -- the source matter -- the complaint didn't

originate from a member in good standing to another member.

If that had happened -- that's the source -- that would then

trigger 110 and all the provisions thereafter.

What counsel is arguing is that the source matters in this scenario -- because the source was obviously counsel -- counsel's office, based on receipt of a subpoena; and, therefore, because the source is not a member in good

1 | standing, those bylaws don't apply.

The problem I have with counsel's argument is where, if anywhere, can I find anywhere that says the source is the controlling factor, and that's the problem.

Now, they can certainly amend their bylaws at some point because what happens is -- if we're talking about a disciplinary proceeding that triggers 110, and 110 says what you have to do. It's a contract between the parties.

Again, I'm just now looking at this sort of and trying to say what's the next step for us? Because if indeed the Court is not convinced that the source is the determining factor, then, you know, a contract has been made at least between your client and IEEE -- but what happens next if indeed they follow the provisions that are laid out in 110 and 7.10?

MR. VERNON: And I think this matter then either will get resolved between counsel -- unless they -- and this is why I'm thinking it's a dismissal without prejudice -- unless they breach what we say is the contract between the parties. And I don't know if that requires the filing of a new lawsuit, if and when they breach it -- I shouldn't say "when" -- if they breach it.

THE COURT: So does my ruling today dispose of the matter in its entirety?

25 MR. VERNON: If the Court is enjoining them from

participating in this hearing, then for the time being -- can I consult?

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THE COURT: I'm going to give you some time to think about it. These are things that we're going to have to figure out because I need to know what the next step is because I'm actually going to require counsel to brief what's the next step and brief the issue of a bond in supplemental briefing because I honestly don't know -- don't know what's next.

If indeed they go back and counsel goes back -properly referring to counsel -- I apologize -- if counsel, Mr. Lindsey goes back and says we can't have the hearing on the 28th, and it appears, at least placed on the oral argument, that the Court is viewing this to be a contract, that we are moving to discipline Dr. Xi and, therefore, it's going to be a provision that if indeed we're pursuing some disciplinary proceeding in order to expel Dr. Xi, that very well, as cited in the August 2nd letter, we're in 110 world; and if we're in 110, there are certain provisions within the provisions of 110.1, 110.3, 110.4 that have to be followed. And if they begin to follow those provisions, ultimately -- it may happen well before January 1st, 2018 -- they may give your client all of what you believe he's contracted -- he's obligated, or they're obligated to provide by way of a contract, and I don't necessarily -- unless there's a new lawsuit that there's been some breach of one of these steps.

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I don't know if this case remains a viable matter for theCourt to consider for a future date.

MR. VERNON: I would like to take a moment to consider that for myself but my suspicion is either the matter would be resolved without prejudice or the matter would be stayed pending whatever process we're going through. I know courts often don't like staying matters.

THE COURT: My docket is what it is, as it is. So we'll see what we do.

I just -- counsel, if you want to respond to any of the questions I just asked Mr. Vernon, we can, but we can think about it and provide the Court further briefing at a subsequent time. What would you prefer, Mr. Lindsay?

MR. LINDSAY: I, frankly, have been asking myself the question what comes next.

THE COURT: The chicken or the egg? I don't know at this point.

MR. LINDSAY: Your Honor has given a general sense of what the ruling is going to be and, obviously, I need to take that back to my client. My client is going to make a decision of what it wants to do. I can imagine a number of possibilities which deal with the what-comes-next issue.

THE COURT: I look forward to reading your submissions. Let me rule.

25 MR. VERNON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

On September 21st, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against defendants. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), the Court may issue a TRO if the moving party shows, "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief." Kos

Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Andrx Corporation, 369 F.3d, 700, 708

(Third Circuit 2004). The grant or denial of a TRO is within the discretion of this Court.

First, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of contract claim. As plaintiff persuasively argues -- and defense do not appear to contest -- the IEEE bylaws are a contract between itself and its members under both New Jersey and New York law. As the parties know, the bylaws provide for specific procedures relating to member discipline in sections I-110. Defendants argue that they need not follow these procedures because the IEEE bylaws and policies are silent with respect to the complaints that are not generated by other IEEE members.

It seems, however, that IEEE management, the board of directors and the president initiated the disciplinary

proceedings against plaintiff, and these individuals appear indisputably to be IEEE members. In fact, the president's August 2nd letter to plaintiffs specifically cites section I-110 and even summarizes some portions of the procedures required under that section. (See exhibit A to plaintiff's complaint.)

Nor is the Court convinced that section I-304, paragraph 10 of the bylaws is fatal to plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim at this time. Defendant's reliance on that clause to justify the disciplinary proceedings would seem to swallow "the lengthy and detailed procedure that the bylaws provide for," to use defendant's language.

(Defendant's brief at 5).

Although defendants emphasize the seriousness of the allegations against plaintiff, plaintiff faces the harshest potential sanction that may result from defendant's contemplated proceedings: Expulsion of the IEEE, with the attendant loss of being a fellow. The Court is not persuaded at this time such a sanction can be justified by section I-304, paragraph 10, which authorizes the board of directors to appoint ad hoc committees "to address specific issue or activity that is not appropriate to be addressed by an ongoing committee of IEEE."

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has met his burden of showing that his odds of prevailing on this claim

are significantly better than negligible, and he need not establish that it is more likely than not that he will prevail. See <u>Reilly v. City of Harrisburg</u>, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (Third Circuit 2017).

Second, as to irreparable harm, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that he will suffer irreparable harm absent temporary restraints. If plaintiff follows the contemplated schedule, he will have to attend the September 28th meeting without having had the benefit of the lengthy and detailed procedures under the bylaws and policies. If he doesn't, the IEEE has warned that he will be expelled and lose his status as an IEEE fellow. The Court finds telling that the defendants do not address plaintiff's contention that, under section I-110.7, the board of directors: "May notify the membership of any expulsion, suspension or censure" and "Notification may include a statement of the circumstances surrounding such action."

Indeed, plaintiff's declaration makes clear that his reputation -- never mind career and livelihood -- faces substantial risk of irreparable harm. As the Court set forth in its ruling on subject matter jurisdiction: There appears to be a substantial risk of the reputational damage from being expelled; it appears that the IEEE can publicly announce such circumstances of any expulsion, and the IEEE's alleged basis for potential expulsion appears to be theft or fraud.

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Third, the Court finds that granting temporary restraints will not result in greater harm to the defendants than to plaintiff. Although defendants argue that time is of the essence because plaintiff will begin his term as president of the Robotics and Automation Society in January 2018, defendants do not explain in their submissions why the procedures under section 7.10 of the policies and -- that's 7.10 of the policies -- and section I-110 of the bylaws cannot be completed by January 2018. Further, as plaintiff aptly notes, defendant's own declaration states that, "In mid-2015, IEEE received a subpoena from a federal grand jury and "IEEE's receipt of the grand jury's subpoena prompted IEEE to conduct an internal investigation related to Dr. Xi's" complaint -- strike that -- "Dr. Xi's claimed expenses." (Declaration of James Prendergast, P-R-E-N-D-E-R-G-A-S-T, paragraphs 10 and 11.) At this stage, the Court finds that time is of the essence for Dr. Xi, more so than it is for the defendants.

Fourth, the Court finds that the public interest would be served in issuing temporary restraints. There are bylaws and policies in place for IEEE members, just like any corporation -- for profit or nonprofit -- members have rights pursuant to such governing documents. The Court is not convinced that plaintiff requested an injunction to simply delay internal proceedings. Rather, this proceeding is in the

public interest because it's about safeguarding rights and privileges pursuant to the bylaws and policies.

Finally, the Court is not convinced by defendant's exhaustion-of-remedies argument. All the defendant's cited authority appears to involve federal agencies. Moreover, it defies logic that the plaintiff must follow the very procedures he's challenged -- irrespective of whatever outcome may follow -- and then seek judicial review. It just doesn't make sense to me. Indeed, as the Court noted, there is the substantial risk of irreparable harm resulting from an adverse outcome.

I am going to grant the remedy sought, that is, enjoining IEEE from conducting a hearing on September 28th, but I am not, at this juncture, doing anything more than that. Okay?

What I now need counsel to do is provide the Court with supplemental briefing on the next step. Do we need discovery? Is there going to be permanent injunction sought? I don't know. And it's up to counsel for both sides to argue their points. I did also have the issue of a bond, that may or may not be necessary under the circumstances, and I would like counsel to address the bond as well as the appropriate amount to require the plaintiff to obviously tender to the Court, should -- now that there has been a favorable reading -- ruling, rather -- as to their immediate -- as to the immediate

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1	restraints.
2	How long do we need? What I ideally would like to see,
3	perhaps, are simultaneous submissions with simultaneous
4	responses that everybody is responding to everything and
5	there's just set briefs and no one certifies or anything like
6	that.
7	How long do you need, counsel? Both of you, in
8	fairness.
9	MR. LINDSAY: Your Honor, a week to 10 days.
10	MR. VERNON: We were going to suggest the same.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Let's select some dates. How
12	about we do a text order, and we'll go ahead and select 10
13	days for the initial moving submissions. And how long for
14	responsive submissions?
15	MR. LINDSAY: I have to check my calendar.
16	THE COURT: Sure. Counsel, I want to work with you
17	all. If there's conflicts or you have trial or something
18	going on I certainly don't want to make life hard for
19	anybody
20	MR. SCHUMACHER: I do have one request, your Honor.
21	I'm supposed to leave, I believe the 10th day to be the 6th of
22	October. I'm out of town for a wedding that I'm in.
23	THE COURT: A wedding that you're in?
24	MR. SCHUMACHER: Yes, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: We can't mess with that.

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1	MR. LINDSAY: Can we move it one day?
2	MR. VERNON: Can we say the 5th, your Honor?
3	THE COURT: Any problem with the 5th?
4	MR. LINDSAY: I don't have any problem with that.
5	THE COURT: The 5th?
6	MR. LINDSAY: Okay.
7	THE COURT: How long do you need for submissions?
8	MR. LINDSAY: One week, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Do you want more, counsel? I see you
10	shaking your head.
11	MR. SCHUMACHER: We would ask for the 13th.
12	THE COURT: Huh?
13	MR. SCHUMACHER: We would ask for the 13th.
14	MR. LINDSAY: I'm traveling on the 12th or the 13th,
15	so I would prefer the 11th.
16	THE COURT: Let's go to that following date.
17	MR. LINDSAY: I'm traveling through the 19th, so
18	that's why I prefer to get it done before I leave.
19	MR. SCHUMACHER: The 11th is fine.
20	THE COURT: All right, the 11th. I don't think I'll
21	need oral argument, but I might. And if I do need oral
22	argument, maybe we do it telephonically. All right?
23	Anything else?
24	MR. WIGGINS: One housekeeping matter, your Honor.
25	We had moved to seal exhibits A, B and C to the Prendergast

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declaration. I spoke to counsel, they have no objection to
that request. Whether your Honor chooses to address it now or
later is obviously up to you.

THE COURT: There's no objection to sealing those documents. I don't see why we can't go ahead and grant that relief sought.

MR. WIGGINS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. SCHUMACHER: No, your Honor. Just the pro hac application, which I'm sure --

Hammer, but we'll go ahead and touch base with his honor. I don't know -- and I always address this at all times -- I don't know if this is one that could be settled, but we should think about it. And I was actually going to ask counsel to think about it, and if you want to come before Judge Hammer, who is, in my opinion, a phenomenal magistrate judge. I know he would welcome an opportunity to see if there's a resolution that could be reached some way, somehow.

So why don't you all contemplate the idea of coming in for an in-person settlement, and I will ask Judge Hammer to set a telephone conference with you to inquire whether there's any interest in trying to resolve the case. Makes sense?

MR. SCHUMACHER: Yes, your Honor.

MR. LINDSAY: Yes, your Honor.

	Temporary Restraining Order
1	THE COURT: Great. I appreciate counsel's arguments
2	here today. The briefs were exceptional and I always,
3	obviously, want to compliment counsel when there are some
4	great briefs. They were great, and provided me some
5	information as well. Thank you, counsel.
6	(Whereupon the proceedings are concluded.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, Mary-Jo Monteleone, CCR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings are a true and accurate transcript of the testimony as taken stenographically by and before me at the time, place, and on the date hereinbefore set forth. I further certify that I am neither related to any of the parties by blood or marriage, nor do I have any interest in the outcome of the above matter. /S/ Mary-Jo Monteleone, CCR, CRR 09/27/2017 Official Court Reporter Date