### Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Broad Qualitative Metric</th>
<th>Identified Specific Actions of the Senior/Key Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>VERY HIGH</strong></td>
<td>Key personnel have <strong>direct foreign ties</strong>, some of which are with strategic competitors (i.e., Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies (CWHTUST) for unauthorized transfer.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) participation in a strategic competitor or CWHTUST Foreign Talent Program. Indicators of an active (ongoing) affiliation with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances. Indicators of active (ongoing) direct funding from a strategic competitor or CWHTUST. Indicators of active (ongoing) affiliation with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong></td>
<td>Key personnel have some foreign ties, some of which are with strategic competitors (i.e., Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies for unauthorized transfer. No Indicators of a <strong>direct foreign affiliation or tie</strong>.</td>
<td>Indicators of past participation in a strategic competitor or CWHTUST Foreign Talent Program. Indicators of past affiliation or present association with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances. Indicators of history/pattern of direct funding from a strategic competitor/CWHTUST. Indicators of active (ongoing), direct affiliation with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE</strong></td>
<td>Key personnel have some foreign ties (family, friends, professional, financial) but some are with strategic competitors (Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies for unauthorized transfer.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) Participation in a Foreign Talent Program of a U.S. ally who has a relationship with a CWHTUST. Indicators of past association with an entity identified in the U.S. Govt denied entity list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances. Indicators of a history of non-consecutive, funding from a strategic competitors/CWHTUST. Indicators of a history/pattern of direct association with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LOW</strong></td>
<td>Key personnel have little or no foreign associations (family, friends, professional, financial) and no foreign affiliations.</td>
<td>No Participation in a Foreign Talent Program. No Indicators of past or current association or affiliation with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances. Current or past funding from a foreign ally, country with no history of targeting US technology, or no foreign funding at all. No indicators of an association or affiliation with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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- **Affiliation** is defined as academic, professional, or institutional appointments or positions with a foreign government-connected entity, whether full-time, part-time, or voluntary (including adjunct, visiting, or honorary), where direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved. Affiliation is NOT considered co-authorship of publications with researchers at a foreign entity.

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- **Risk** may be amplified if the DARPA technology being pursued is similar to the technology/research of the Senior/Key Personnel’s indicators.

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### Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric

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<th>Rating</th>
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<tr>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>Key personnel have <em>direct foreign ties, some of which are</em> with strategic competitors (i.e., Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies (CWHTUST) for unauthorized transfer.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) participation in a strategic competitor or CWHTUST Foreign Talent Program.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) direct funding from a strategic competitor or CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) affiliation with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Key personnel have some foreign ties, <em>some of which are with strategic competitors</em> (i.e., Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies for unauthorized transfer. No Indicators of a <em>direct foreign affiliation or tie.</em></td>
<td>Indicators of past participation in a strategic competitor or CWHTUST Foreign Talent Program.</td>
<td>Indicators of past affiliation or present association with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing), direct association with a high risk foreign institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>Key personnel have some foreign ties (family, friends, professional, financial) but none are with strategic competitors (Russia, China) or other countries with a history of targeting U.S. technologies for unauthorized transfer.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) participation in a Foreign Talent Program of a U.S. ally who has a relationship with a CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of past association with an entity identified in the U.S. Govt denied entity list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
<td>Indicators of a history of non-consecutive, funding from a strategic competitor/CWHTUST.</td>
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<td>LOW</td>
<td>Key personnel have little or no foreign associations (family, friends, professional, financial) and no foreign affiliations.</td>
<td>No Participation in a Foreign Talent Program.</td>
<td>No Indicators of past or current association or affiliation with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
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- **Risk** may be amplified if the DARPA technology being pursued is similar to the technology/research of the Senior/Key Personnel’s indicators.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for Public Release. Distribution Unlimited.
Dear Bindu, Kevin, Jason, Jason, and Wes,

I wanted to thank you again on behalf of the computing research community and CRA for taking the time to talk with us today and give us an insight into your thinking about the DARPA CFIP and the risk rubric. We really appreciate the opportunity to share our concerns with you and your willingness to see the “human faces” who are the subjects of these policies.

We also wanted to reemphasize that, while we have concerns about specific elements of the rubric, we do not wish to minimize the risk of foreign influence operations on U.S. research, including in academia. We hope to encourage a policy that helps mitigate that risk without risking a chilling effect on academic researcher participation in defense-related research. It’s our strong belief that the nation is best served by having the best minds in academia as well as in industry thinking about defense problems, so your willingness to consider modifying the rubric to remove some of the aspects that could lead to that chill is most welcomed.

To reiterate, during the call there were three specific suggestions we think would help remove some of the concern from the rubric:

Remove specific mentions of countries so that the policy doesn’t seem targeted at one or two particular nationalities.

Remove the “Broad Qualitative Metric” category and focus on the Identified Specific Actions of the senior/key personnel. Focus on the activities of individuals rather than broad associations. Also note that activities that were legal and appropriate when they were undertaken shouldn’t be triggers even if they are today considered problematic.

Replace or reword mentions of degrees of “risk” associated with people because of nationality or family, etc. The current wording implies people are risks simply because of family or ethnicity, which is not what you intend and which is a potential source of needless anxiety.

We’d be happy to provide further input on revisions to the policy if you’d find that useful. And we look forward to seeing the implementation guidance from the Administration when that’s ultimately available. We know that this is an evolving process. We know that the interactions between university SPOs and DARPA has improved greatly and wish to see that continue. To the extent we can help that process, we are pleased to do so. So please don’t hesitate to reach out.

Thanks again for a frank and open conversation!

-Peter Harsha
## Risk-Based Measures to Assess Potential Undue Foreign Influence Conflicts of Interest or Conflicts of Commitment

### Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Factor 1: Foreign Talent Program</th>
<th>Factor 2: Denied Entity Lists</th>
<th>Factor 3: Funding Sources</th>
<th>Factor 4: Foreign Institutions or Entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) participation in a Foreign Talent Program run by the government of a strategic competitor or country with a history of targeting U.S. technologies (CWHTUST) for unauthorized transfer.</td>
<td>Indicators of an active (ongoing) affiliation with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) direct funding from a foreign government or a foreign government-connected entity of a strategic competitor or CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) affiliation with a high-risk foreign government, or foreign government-connected, institution or entity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Indicators of past participation in a Foreign Talent Program run by the government of a strategic competitor or CWHTUST but with indications that a professional association with the program has continued.</td>
<td>Indicators of past affiliation or multiple recent associations (within the last four years) with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
<td>Indicators of history/pattern of direct funding from a foreign government or from a foreign government-connected entity of a strategic competitor or CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of multiple active (ongoing) direct associations with a high-risk foreign government, or foreign government-connected, institution or entity.</td>
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<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>Indicators of active (ongoing) participation in a Foreign Talent Program run by the government of a U.S. ally who has technology sharing agreement with a CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of multiple past associations with an entity identified in the U.S Govt denied entity list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
<td>Indicators of past non-consecutive, sporadic funding from a foreign government or foreign government-connected entity of a strategic competitor or CWHTUST.</td>
<td>Indicators of multiple past direct associations with a high-risk foreign government, or foreign government-connected, institution or entity.</td>
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<td>LOW</td>
<td>No Participation in a Foreign Talent Program.</td>
<td>No Indicators of past or current association or affiliation with an entity on the US Govt identified denied entity or person list or EO 13959 or subsequent similar issuances.</td>
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<td>No indicators of an association or affiliation with a high-risk foreign government, or foreign government connected, institution or entity.</td>
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**Note 1:** The existence of disclosures involving any of the four factors in this rubric is not automatically disqualifying.

**Note 2:** Co-authorship by itself is not a consideration of this rubric.

**Note 3:** Affiliation is defined as academic, professional, or institutional appointments or positions with a foreign government or government-connected entity, whether full-time, part-time, or voluntary (including adjunct, visiting, or honorary), where direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

**Note 4:** Association is defined as academic, professional, or institutional appointments or positions with a foreign government or government-connected entity, whether full-time, part-time, or voluntary (including adjunct, visiting, or honorary), where no direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

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https://bit.ly/2YPcFy1
COUNTERING FOREIGN INFLUENCE PROGRAM (CFIP) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ)  
December 1, 2021

1. **Q: What is CFIP?**  
   **A1:** CFIP is an effort to help identify and mitigate undue foreign influence conflicts of commitment/conflicts of interest (CoC/CoI) in DoD Science and Technology (S&T) research grants and cooperative agreements by identifying possible conflicts of interest or commitment by academic researchers.

   **A2:** DARPA uses risk-based measures to assess potential CoC/COI based on information submitted by researchers as part of their fundamental research grant/cooperative agreement proposal submission. Researcher information is submitted via the SF 424 “Senior/Key Personnel Profile (Expanded)” and its associated attachments.

   **A3:** In order to ensure that our policy and processes are transparent, DARPA posted reference documents to our public website. In addition, our CFIP information for bidders is explained in our Broad Agency/Research Announcement instructions.

2. **Q: What policies required the establishment of CFIP (Who is driving this policy)?**  
   **A1:** DARPA is following a (2019) USD R&E Memo “Protection of Intellectual Property, Controlled Info, Key Personnel, and Critical Technologies.” This memorandum provided the direction to use the SF 424 to collect specific information regarding Senior/Key Personnel.

   **A2:** This USD(R&E) 2019 memorandum was informed by the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1286, which directed the DoD to address this challenge. It has been subsequently reinforced by the USD(R&E) DoDI 5000.83 “Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage” as well as the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act and National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPOM 33). It is likely DARPA’s policy will evolve once NSPOM 33 implementation is complete.

20. Q: Where did your definitions of Association and Affiliation come from?
A: These definitions are drawn from key language provided in NSPM-33.

21. Q: Is DARPA’s policy consistent with other DoD S&T Organization CFIP policies?
A: DARPA has collaborated with various DoD S&T Organizations to learn about their programs. They have all played a role in the USD(R&E) sponsored S&T Protection Working Group, which has spearheaded the education, awareness, and communication of this mission area. DARPA has taken lessons learned and input from those organizations while also taking into consideration our unique organization and mission in tailoring our policies and processes.

22. Q: How is DARPA engaging the Federal Working Group on this topic that is being led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy?
A: USD(R&E) is the DoD representative to that working group. We have provided USD(R&E) input and information regarding our processes to include our analysis of other pertinent issuances pertaining to this mission area.

23. Q: Did DARPA coordinate with the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Health (NIH), or the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)?
A: No. DARPA is aware of various other federal agency programs and has received topical briefings regarding some. However, DARPA’s program is designed to meet the requirements as outlined in the direction from USD(R&E) tailored to fit our organizational culture and business processes.

24. Q: What are some best practices that academia can implement regarding education and mitigation of “undue foreign influence?”
A1: The following federal government issuances include best practices and considerations:

- *White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Recommended Practices For Strengthening The Security And Integrity Of America’s Science And Technology Research”, January 2021“*

- *White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House: Enhancing The Security And Integrity Of America’s Research Enterprise: October 2020*

A2: U.S. academic associations and groups have also published guidance to their constituents detailing the issue and recommendations/options for processes they can implement at their institutions. The Academic Security and Counter Exploitation Program (ASCEP), and its associated Working Group, is